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The debate over the legitimacy of judicial use of legislative history has significant legal and political ramifications
that have long sparked controversy. As additional commentators join this long-running engagement, the focus of the debate
necessarily changes.
In a previous article, John Manning argued that the use
of legislative history violates the constitutional rule barring
congressionalself-delegation. JonathanSiegel argues here that
judicial reliance on legislative history does not implicate that
rule, because a statute's legislative history already exists at the
time of the statute's passage, and statutory incorporation of
pre-existing materials operates as an adoption of those materials, not as a delegation of legislative power. To illustrate this
point, Professor Siegel introduces, as a thought experiment, a
hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act. The Act provides
that the legislative history of every future statute will be automatically incorporated into the statute, without express adoption, and instructs courts to give customary weight to that in-

corporated legislative history. Siegel concludes that, because
legislatures are permitted to incorporate, by reference, preenactment legislative history into statutes, such an Act would
be constitutional.
Disagreeingwith that conclusion, ProfessorManning responds that Siegel's Act would only formalize an unconstitutional delegation of power. He argues that the resulting arrangement-of the Act or of judicial reliance on legislative history-would allow members of Congress to subvert the aims of
bicameralism and presentment. He posits that the hypothetical
Act would effectively enable them to vote for a statute without
taking full responsibility for legislative history that resulted
from factional logrolling. This separation of the legislators'
responsibility from the legislative result (viz. statutory text),
Manning concludes, permits Congress to enact binding statutory details through a process condemned by Supreme Court
jurisprudencebecause it is not prescribed by the Constitution.
In a brief reply, Professor Siegel argues that the hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act would not allow lawmakers to evade responsibility,because Congress would still be
obligated to ratify agent-preparedlegislative history when voting for each statute. Because of this chronology, Siegel concludes, the Act would take legislative history out of the delegation doctrine altogether.

